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Abstract
The labor wedge accounts for a large fraction of business cycle
￿ uctuations. This paper uses a search and matching model to decom-
pose the labor wedge into three classes of labor market frictions and
evaluate their role. We ￿nd that frictions to job destruction and bar-
gaining commonly considered in the search literature are not helpful
in explaining the labor wedge. We also identify an asymmetric e⁄ect
of separation, bargaining and matching frictions on unemployment, as
well as a potential solution to Shimer￿ s puzzle.
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For the last 25 years, macro and labor economists have pointed to large
cyclical variations in the relationship between the marginal rate of substi-
tution between leisure and consumption and the marginal product of labor
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1as an important feature of business cycles. In their business cycle account-
ing framework, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) (CKM) label this re-
lationship a "labor wedge" and argue that it accounts for 60% of output
￿ uctuations.
In this paper we look at the labor wedge through the lens of a search and
matching model. We decompose the labor wedge into three classes of labor
market frictions modeled as exogenous separation, bargaining and match-
ing shocks and use the business cycle accounting methodology to evaluate
their quantitative importance. Our main ￿nding is that imperfections in the
job destruction and bargaining processes commonly considered in the search
literature are not helpful in explaining the labor wedge.
Equilibrium search and matching models provide a natural framework
for studying labor market frictions manifested by the labor wedge. Matching
frictions are also a common way of introducing adjustment along the exten-
sive margin into business cycle models. However, Shimer (2005a) pointed
out that the matching friction itself works as a labor adjustment cost and
alone cannot explain variations in the two key labor market variables: un-
employment and vacancies.
In order to help solve this puzzle various additional frictions have been in-
troduced into search and matching models. One class of frictions introduced
by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) is endogenous job destruction, which
we capture using an exogenous shock to the rate at which workers are sepa-
rated from their jobs. The other class of frictions proposed by Hall (2005a)
and analyzed by Shimer (2010) replaces the Nash bargaining solution with
a backward-looking wage-setting rule. In our model this form of wage stick-
iness is represented more generally by exogenous variations in the relative
bargaining power of workers and ￿rms. Finally, we introduce a third, resid-
ual source of frictions by allowing for exogenous variations in the e¢ ciency
of the matching process.
Our modeling approach augments the representative agent RBC model
with a search and matching friction as in Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996).
The standard assumption that labor is traded in a spot market is replaced
by a search friction which puts an additional constraint on how much labor
can be employed. The model endogenously determines the level of unem-
ployment, the number of vacancies and the labor force participation rate as
in Farmer and Hollenhorst (2006). To model the frictions mentioned above
we introduce three shocks which jointly determine the labor wedge in the
model: the separation shock, the matching shock and the bargaining shock.
2The separation shock represents the proportion of employed workers that get
separated from their jobs every period. The matching shock represents the
e¢ ciency of the matching technology. The bargaining shock represents the
proportions in which the lifetime surplus of a newly formed match is split
between the worker and the ￿rm and thus pins down wages.
To evaluate the relative importance of each shock we use the business
cycle accounting methodology employed in Cole and Ohanian (2002) and
CKM. For identi￿cation purposes in addition to three labor market shocks,
our model includes a TFP shock, an investment shock and a government
consumption shock. We use data on real GDP, consumption, investment,
hours, unemployment and vacancies to recover the six shocks: TFP, invest-
ment, government consumption, separation, matching and bargaining. We
use the model as a diagnostic tool and measure the contributions of each
shock to each of the six variables by running a counterfactual exercise: we
￿t the shocks back into the model one at a time and all but one at a time.
Compared to the neoclassical growth model in our model it is di¢ cult to
directly apply the business cycle accounting methodology. First, in order to
recover the exact values of the underlying shocks we would have to iterate
over the solution of the model until we ￿nd a ￿xed point of a complicated
system of forward-looking equations. Instead, we compute the ￿rst order
approximation of the model around a stochastic trend and use the Kalman
￿lter to recover the shocks. Second, there is substantial controversy on the
values of many labor market parameters, so we use a Bayesian estimation
strategy to recover them, and let the data speak for itself.
Our accounting exercise leads us to a striking conclusion: variations in
job destruction and impediments to the bargaining process jointly account
for less than 10 percent of variations in the labor wedge. More than 90
percent of variations in the labor wedge are attributed to the residual shock
to matching e¢ ciency. This implies that commonly used frictions, such as
endogenous variations in job destruction and wage stickiness, do not play a
signi￿cant role in determining the labor wedge.
Our results indicate that a labor market friction responsible for variations
in the labor wedge must be isomorphic to changes in matching e¢ ciency. This
broad class of frictions includes variations in per capita costs associated with
creating jobs, variations in time and e⁄ort devoted to search by unemployed
workers, variations in the level of congestion and in the degree of competition
between peers characterizing the matching process.
Apart from the main result that shocks to matching e¢ ciency play a lead-
3ing role in explaining the labor wedge, accounting for more than 90% of its
variation, our results have two main implications. First, both job creation
and job destruction shocks play an important role in output and unemploy-
ment ￿ uctuations. This last result is relevant for the debate between Shimer
(2005b) and Fujita and Ramey (2007) on whether job destruction or job cre-
ation is more important for ￿ uctuations in output and unemployment. We
￿nd that both job destruction (separation) and job creation (bargaining and
matching) shocks play a role, but at di⁄erent points in time. At the beginning
of a recession a decline in TFP coincides with an increase in the separation
rate. As unemployment increases, the reservation value (threat-point) of the
workers falls while an increase in the bargaining power of workers keeps the
wage fairly constant. The corresponding decrease in the bargaining power of
the ￿rms leads to a decline in vacancies. Later the e¢ ciency of the matching
process falls, keeping unemployment at a high level. Thus, understanding
the causes of excessive job destruction at the beginning of recessions, as well
as sources of wage rigidity and insu¢ cient matching during the recovery are
equally important for understanding the behavior of the labor market.
The second implication of our results is a potential solution to Shimer￿ s
puzzle. Shimer (2005a) pointed out that standard Mortensen-Pissarides-
type models are incapable of simultaneously generating high volatility of
unemployment and vacancies and low volatility of wages. Our model while
matching series for unemployment and vacancies by construction, predicts
a path for wages which matches remarkably well the behavior of wages in
the data. The fact that we match the volatility of wage data without using
it in the estimation procedure, both serves as an over-identifying restriction
on our empirical exercise 1, and stresses the importance of changes in the
outside option of workers as the main driving force behind the variations
in bargaining power. Hall (2005b) suggested that changes in the bargaining
power can be generated by ￿ uctuations in the marginal product of labor when
wages are sticky. Our results show that in order to ￿t the data, additional
signi￿cant ￿ uctuations in the outside option of workers are necessary.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical
framework and introduces the six shocks, Section 3 describes the methodol-
ogy we use to estimate the model and recover the shocks, Section 4 explains
1Note that the ability of a search model to match volatilities of unemployment and
vacancies does not automatically imply matching the behavior of wages, as shown by
Lubik (2009)
4the results and Section 5 concludes.
1 Theoretical Framework
This section lays out the setup of the model. We modify the standard one
sector real business cycle model by adding a search technology for moving
labor between productive activities and leisure. We assume that the economy
is populated by a continuum of families. Each family operates a backyard
technology and completely insures its members against variations in their
labor incomes. Members of a family cannot work in their own backyard, but
can be employed in two market activities: head-hunting which is competitive
and a productive activity where the wage is set according to a speci￿c wage-
setting rule.
1.1 Model
The economy faces six exogenous shocks. A total factor productivity (TFP)
shock At, an investment speci￿c technology shock Tt, a government expen-
diture shock Gt, a shock to the separation rate of employment ￿Lt, a shock
to matching e¢ ciency Bt and a shock to the bargaining power of workers ￿t.
This last shock ￿t represents the fraction of the lifetime surplus of the match
that goes to the worker, hence, as we will show later on, ￿t determines the
wage wt in the productive sector.
At the beginning of period t values of shocks At, Tt, ￿Lt, Gt, Bt, ￿t, capital
Kt, labor supply Ls
t￿1 and demand Ld
t￿1, the job ￿nding and vacancy ￿lling
rates are given. The head of each family decides how many members V s
t to
send to look for a head-hunting job and how many members of other families
V d
t to hire in the head-hunting market to search for unemployed workers
to ￿ll in positions in the backyard ￿rm. Each head-hunter represents one
vacancy and is paid a wage qt.
The head of the family also decides how many members Ls
t to send to
work in productive activities and how many members of other families Ld
t
to employ to operate her own backyard technology. Finally, the head of the
family assigns Ut members to apply for jobs in other families￿backyards,
allocates resources to consumption Ct of its members and invests into capital
Kt+1 next period.
We introduce head-hunters into the model in order to measure costs of
5searching for a worker and costs of searching for a job in the same units of
disutility of labor. We distinguish between labor demand and supply in both
markets in order to derive shadow prices of both types of employment and
compute the value of a match.
Each family head maximizes the expected lifetime utility of its members
(1), subject to a budget constraint (2) and labor supply and demand accu-
















































where ￿ Mt is the total number of matches formed in the economy in period
t. In equation (3), labor supply in period t depends on last period￿ s labor
supply minus the number of workers that got separated from their job plus the
new formed matches. The separation rate ￿Lt denotes the exogenously given
rate at which workers are separated from their jobs and captures the various
frictions leading to variations in job destruction over the cycle. The term
￿ Mt
￿ Ut stands for the job ￿nding rate and represents the increase in employment
when there is one more individual searching for a job (Ut increases by one
unit). In equation (4), labor demand accumulates in the same way as labor
supply with the di⁄erence that the term V d
t
￿ Mt
￿ Vt is the vacancy ￿lling rate
times the number of head-hunters demanded and means that for every new
individual that works as a head-hunter V d




The markets for labor and head-hunting clear when Ls
t = Ld
t = Lt and
V s
t = V d
t = Vt. The law of motion of aggregate employment satis￿es:
Lt = (1 ￿ ￿Lt)Lt￿1 + Mt; (5)
and in equilibrium ￿ Ut = Ut, ￿ Vt = Vt and
￿ Mt = Mt = BtM(Ut;Vt): (6)
6In equation (6) Bt represents the e¢ ciency of the matching technology, de-
termining the number of matches formed for each combination of the numbers
of workers and head-hunters seeking for a match. The resource constraint
















































































In the equations above ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
labor supply accumulation constraint and ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier as-
sociated with the labor demand accumulation constraint, both measured
in units of marginal utility of consumption. Since Tt, At, ￿Lt, Gt and Bt
are exogenous, we have a system of ten equations and eleven variables,
fKt+1;Lt;Ct;Mt;Yt;Vt;Ut;￿t;￿t; wt;qtg. The model is missing an equilib-
rium condition because equations (10) and (11) determine two di⁄erent ways
of moving labor between leisure and employment in productive activities and
there is only one price wt. Therefore, we introduce a bargaining shock to close
the model.
71.2 Introducing Bargaining Shocks








































(1 ￿ ￿Lk) (16)
The Lagrange multiplier in the labor demand (supply) accumulation
equation is the expected sum of instantaneous marginal values of the match
for the representative ￿rm (worker), discounted and adjusted for the proba-
bility of the match being dissolved in any given period.
Similarly, the sum ￿t + ￿t of the two Lagrange multipliers can be inter-
preted as the lifetime surplus of the match￿ an expected sum of instanta-
neous marginal values of the match discounted and adjusted for the proba-






























A standard way to close search and matching models is to assume that
the worker and the ￿rm use Nash bargaining over the wage and split the
surplus in constant proportions. However, Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005b)
argue that for a Mortensen-Pissarides-type model to ￿t the data one needs
variations in the bargaining power. In order to incorporate such a friction we
close the model by assuming that the surplus ￿t is split between the worker
and the ￿rm according to a time-varying rule.2
We de￿ne a variable ￿t to represent the fraction of the lifetime surplus
of the match going to the worker, and (1 ￿ ￿t) the fraction of the lifetime
surplus of the match going to the ￿rm. We assume that ￿t = (1 ￿ ￿t)￿t and
￿t = ￿t￿t. Hence, we refer to ￿t as the bargaining power of the worker as well
as the bargaining shock. Notice that allocations are economically ine¢ cient
2For a more general description of how we construct the bargaining shock see Appendix
A.
8whenever ￿t is di⁄erent from the elasticity of the matching function with
respect to the number of unemployed.3
Substituting the bargaining shock and the lifetime surplus of the match











































Equation (18) governs the behavior of the total value of the match. To-
day￿ s value is equal to the instantaneous gain from a newly formed match
plus the future value, discounted and adjusted for the possibility of being
destroyed tomorrow.
Equations (19) and (20) equate the marginal bene￿ts and marginal costs
of head-hunting and searching for a job respectively and thus pin down va-
cancies and unemployment. Equations (21) and (22) below determine the














































(1 ￿ ￿Lt+1) (22)
A competitive equilibrium of the model economy is a solution to equations
(5)-(9), (12), and (18)-(22) where fKt+1;Ct;Lt;Vt;Ut;￿t;wt;qt;￿t;Yt;Mtg
are endogenous variables and fAt;Tt; ￿Lt;Gt;Bt;￿tg are the exogenous shocks
of the model. The exogenous variables behave according to stochastic processes
to be de￿ned later.
3See Hosios (1990) for a detailed discussion.
91.3 Identifying assumptions
Most of the functional forms we use are standard in the literature. We assume




We assume that the matching function is also Cobb-Douglas and consistent
with constant returns to scale:
M(U;V ) = U
￿V
1￿￿ (24)
We postulate a utility function consistent with a balanced growth path and
where fractions of time spent head-hunting and searching for a job enter
symmetrically with the time spent on the production activity:
U(C;L;U;V ) = logC ￿ ￿




The functional form for hours is the only non-standard assumption we make.
It implies that workers get the same disutility from working in productive
activities as when searching for a job or head-hunting. This assumption may
seem somewhat extreme, but we assume that although individuals spend
only a few hours per week searching for a job, they also spend time in other
activities that generate disutility: in expanding their network by making
phone calls, getting technical training, continuing their education, helping
their relatives or working in home production.
Another implication of this assumption is that the costs of searching for
a job from the point of view of an unemployed worker and of a ￿rm with a
vacant position are equalized. While micro data sheds little light on how to
discipline these costs, this assumption delivers a clear-cut interpretation of
the shocks. In the decomposition we perform this assumption distinguishes
the variations in labor market variables attributed to the bargaining shock
from those attributed to the matching shock. It insures that any variations
in the search costs on the worker and ￿rm sides show up as variations in
the matching e¢ ciency shock, while variations in the wage-setting practices
show up as the bargaining shock.
In the decomposition we perform, this utility function also a⁄ects the
behavior of the reservation value of the workers and search costs. The para-
meter ￿ determines how much the labor costs fall as families spend less time
in the labor market.
10Given these functional forms and stochastic processes for the shocks, to
be explained later, the shocks are uniquely identi￿ed. Appendix A explains
step by step how given data on output, consumption, investment, hours,
unemployment and vacancies one can recover the shocks.
1.4 Decomposing the Labor Wedge
Here we explore how the three labor market shocks a⁄ect the labor wedge
and jointly determine its behavior. Combining equations (19) and (20) and




















t (1 ￿ ￿t)
1￿￿ (27)
Substituting these into equation (18) moving everything except the mar-

























Equation (28) shows how the separation, bargaining and matching shocks
together form a connection between the marginal product of labor and the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption: the labor
wedge.
Note that when the separation shock is non-persistent and since only its
expectation a⁄ects the labor wedge, it cannot play a signi￿cant quantitative
role. This is true because agents expect the separation rate next period to be
in the neighborhood of the steady-state. However, in general both matching
and bargaining shocks can have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the labor wedge.
Changes in the matching shock are always going to matter, while the
importance of the bargaining shock depends on the relationship between ￿
and the steady-state value of ￿t. Notice that an increase in the bargaining
power of workers always leads to a corresponding decrease in the bargaining
power of ￿rms and the total e⁄ect of the term ￿
￿
t (1 ￿ ￿t)
1￿￿ depends on ￿.




t (1 ￿ ￿t)
1￿￿
@￿t


















This implies that even when the Hosios condition does not hold exactly,
but holds on average, changes in the bargaining power do not signi￿cantly
a⁄ect the labor wedge. In fact the values of ￿ and ￿ss have to be very far
apart for the bargaining power to have a substantial e⁄ect on the labor wedge.
Therefore it is natural to expect matching shocks to play a dominant role in
determining the behavior of the labor wedge.
2 Methodology
This section describes the details of the estimation procedure. Our esti-
mation strategy is di⁄erent from that of CKM in three dimensions. First,
because computing the shocks exactly involves solving a complicated ￿xed
point problem, we apply the Kalman ￿lter to a linearized version of the model
to compute the shocks approximately.
Second, though some of the parameters can be calibrated, others have no
analogs in the literature. In order to let the data choose appropriate values
for these parameters we apply a Bayesian estimation strategy, which uses
the Kalman ￿lter results from the ￿rst step and iterates over the parameter
space using Markov Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) methods.
Finally, estimation results can depend signi￿cantly (see Cogley and Nason
(1995)) on the way the data is pre-￿ltered. In order to avoid certain ￿lter-
ing biases we minimize the extent to which we alter the data. We embed
the trends into the model. We describe in detail a procedure of detrending
the model around a non-stationary stochastic trend, which we borrow from
Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007).
2.1 Processes for the shocks
In the data real output, consumption and investment are nonstationary even
with respect to a log-linear trend. To make the data comparable to the model,
12the business cycle literature commonly uses the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ￿lter.
However, Cogley and Nason (1995) and Canova (1998) show that the use of
the ￿lter introduces signi￿cant biases into the data by amplifying business-
cycle frequencies even if it does not have any. To avoid pre￿ltering the data
we follow the approach presented in Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez
(2007) and assume random walks for the two processes that are commonly
thought to be extremely persistent: the TFP and investment shocks At and
Tt
4.
We denote ass the mean growth rate of TFP, and ￿ss the mean growth
rate of the investment-speci￿c technology. We assume that the rest of the
shocks follow ￿rst-order autoregressive processes.
We denote the separation rate in steady-state ￿Lss, the fraction of hours
spent on head-hunting in steady-state Bss, the average bargaining power
which determines the vacancy-unemployment ratio ￿ss, and the steady-state
fraction of GDP consumed by the government gss. Also ￿￿ and ￿￿ denote
the standard deviations and autocorrelations of the shocks. All innovations
are assumed to be standard normal5. We do not put restrictions on the
correlations of these innovations6.
2.2 Detrending
Here we describe how to detrend the model with respect to a pair of non-
stationary trends. From the optimality conditions of the model we can see
that all variables except capital grow at a factor (ass￿￿
ss)
1
1￿￿. Then, if we
take the ￿rst di⁄erences of the TFP and investment shocks by de￿ning
at = At
At￿1 = ass exp(￿A"At), ￿t = Tt
Tt￿1 = ￿ss exp(￿T"Tt), we can derive
an aggregate trend Z
1￿￿
t = AtT ￿
t , which will be common to all the vari-
ables except capital. Hence, we can de￿ne detrended variables of the form:
xt = Xt
Zt￿1: Capital grows at a factor (ass￿ss)
1




Similarly to the result of King et. al. (1988) given separability of the
utility function, we need to assume logarithmic utility for there to exist a
balanced growth path. This will not a⁄ect our results since Hansen (1986)
4In fact using an HP-￿lter does not change any of our main results.
5We focus on realizations of ￿t and ￿Lt which are in the interval [0,1].
6We estimated the model under di⁄erent correlation structures and this assumption
does not a⁄ect any of our results.
13has shown that quantitatively the degree of risk aversion has almost no e⁄ect
on the behavior of quantities in real business cycle models.
Appendix B shows the resulting detrended equilibrium conditions of the
model. This model possesses a unique steady-state￿ we describe the algo-
rithm of computing the steady-state in Appendix B as well. We then linearize
the model around the steady-state, compute the state-space representation
and estimate the parameters.
2.3 Data
We use six variables in our estimation procedure: 1) real per capita GDP,
2) real per capita nondurable consumption expenditures, 3) real per capita
gross private domestic investment (including durable consumption), 4) an
index of aggregate weekly per capita hours worked in private industries, 5)
the unemployment rate and 6) the Conference Board help-wanted advertising
index as a proxy for vacancies.
All data are seasonally adjusted. Monthly data is averaged to make it
quarterly. We divide by population to obtain per capita values. This corre-
sponds to modeling the economy using a representative household/￿rm. We
remove an extremely low frequency trend from hours, unemployment and
vacancies, using an hp-￿lter with a smoothing parameter 100000 (we follow
Shimer (2005a)). This removes long-run secular trends, which are a result of
demographic and other factors unrelated to business cycles. We normalize
the resulting detrended indexes of hours and vacancies to one on average.
We take logs of GDP, consumption and investment, and then take the ￿rst
di⁄erence. All data we use is for the period 1964:I-2007:III.
To be able to estimate the model we need to add six measurement equa-
tions corresponding to the six variables that we observe. Since the data for
real output, consumption and investment are modeled as nonstationary, we
take the ￿rst di⁄erences of the data to make it comparable to the model.
In addition, the de￿nition of output in our model includes time spent head-
hunting. In the real economy ￿rms are paying head-hunters a wage and it is
measured as part of GDP. To account for this, we derive the price of time
spent head-hunting, multiply it by the amount of time spent in this activity
and include the product in our de￿nition of GDP.
Hours in our model correspond to the total time spent on the productive
activity and head-hunting. This index corresponds closely to total employ-
ment Lt +Vt, since most of the cyclical variation in hours is on the extensive
14margin (see Gertler, Sala, Trigari (2008) and Hall (2005b)) 7. Due to the
above correspondence between hours and employment, the time spent by the
representative agent searching for a job as a fraction of the total time spent
in the labor market Ut
Lt+Vt+Ut corresponds to the number of people searching
for a job as a fraction of people participating in the labor market￿ the unem-
ployment rate. Changes in the help-wanted advertising index proxy changes
in the number of vacancies Vt posted by ￿rms.
2.4 Calibration and Estimation
Our model has 9 structural parameters and 13 parameters that character-
ize the shocks. The scale parameter Lss does not a⁄ect the log-linearized
representation of the model. There are three parameters standard to the
business-cycle literature that we calibrate. We set the share of capital in
the Cobb-Douglas production function ￿ to 0.34, the discount factor ￿ to
0.99, the depreciation rate ￿K to 2.5% per quarter. We set the steady-state
value of the government shock to 22% of GDP, the average value in the data.
We also set the elasticity of matches to unemployment ￿ to 0.7, the value
used by Shimer (2005a); this falls within the range of values plausible from a
microeconomic perspective reported by Blanchard and Diamond (1989). We
calibrate this parameter because it is not well-identi￿ed. We ￿nd that this
value of ￿ helps us match the volatility of wages, a series which is not used
in our estimation procedure.
From the average growth rates of investment, consumption and output we
infer the means of innovations to TFP and investment shocks. We calibrate
them to be 0.16 percent and 0.12 percent per quarter respectively. Table 1
summarizes the calibrated parameters.
We estimate the model using Bayesian methods (see An and Schorfheide
(2007)). Linearized equations of the model combined with the linearized
measurement equations form a state-space representation of the model. We
apply the Kalman ￿lter to compute the likelihood of the data given the
model and to obtain smoothed estimates of the innovations to the shocks. We




, where p is the parameter vector,








￿0 (p). Draws from the posterior distribution are
7We have estimated the model using data on total employment instead of total hours.
Most of our results remain unchanged. We prefer using hours so that we can directly
compare our results to CKM.
15￿ ￿ ￿K gss ￿ ass ￿ss
0.34 0.99 0.025 0.22 0.7 1.0016 1.0012
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Prior Posterior
Distribution Mean S.D. Mean [5% 95%]
￿ log Normal 0.00 2.000 3.54 [2.97, 4.43]
￿Lss Gamma 0.02 0.010 0.036 [0.030, 0.043]
!ss Gamma 0.35 0.150 0.61 [0.49, 0.73]
￿ss Beta 0.50 0.200 0.56 [0.49, 0.64]
Table 2: Prior and posterior distributions of structural parameters
generated using the Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. We use
the Random-Walk Metropolis-Hastings implementation.
Table 2 reports the prior and posterior distributions of each structural
parameter. The parameter !ss represents the steady-state job ￿nding rate.
We estimate the elasticity of the utility function ￿ with respect to labor to be
3.548. This high elasticity leads to large variations in the value of non-market
activity to be discussed later.
We estimate the steady-state separation rate to be 3.6%. This is much
lower than Shimer￿ s (2005a) quarterly estimate of the separation probability
for employed workers. This di⁄erence comes from the fact that our separa-
tion rate corresponds to the average fraction of jobs permanently destroyed
every quarter. In additional to the permanent destruction an estimate of the
separation rate would include a component capturing short-term turnover
between employment and unemployment and a large job-to-job transition
component. Assuming (following Shimer) that the average job ￿nding rate
is 40% per month and the separation rate to be 3% per month, the e⁄ec-
tive number of people becoming and staying unemployed until next quarter
should be around 2-3%, which is consistent with our estimate. Our model
implies a 61% average job-￿nding rate which is also comparable to Shimer￿ s
estimates.
We estimate the steady-state bargaining power ￿ss to be 0.56, which is
close to the value of 0.5 common in the literature (see Mortensen and Nagypal
8We assume a log normal distribution with the support on [￿1;+1), which is equivalent
to log (￿ + 1) being normally distributed.
16Parameter Prior Posterior
Distribution Mean S.D. Mean [5%, 95%]
￿S Beta 0.50 0.20 0.72 [0.65, 0.80]
￿M Beta 0.80 0.10 0.86 [0.84, 0.88]
￿B Beta 0.80 0.10 0.98 [0.96, 0.99]
￿G Beta 0.80 0.10 0.90 [0.87, 0.92]
￿A IGamma 0.02 0.010 0.0067 [0.0062, 0.0073]
￿T IGamma 0.02 0.010 0.0074 [0.0067, 0.0081]
￿S IGamma 0.25 0.100 0.180 [0.154, 0.212]
￿M IGamma 0.10 0.050 0.087 [0.070, 0.099]
￿B IGamma 0.10 0.050 0.046 [0.038, 0.055]
￿G IGamma 0.08 0.040 0.025 [0.022, 0.028]
Table 3: Prior and posterior distributions of shock parameters
(2007) and Hall (2005b)). The estimates of the two parameters !ss and ￿ss
jointly imply, that the average reservation utility is approximately 80% of
the worker￿ s marginal product. This moves in the direction of Hagedorn and
Manovsky￿ s (2008) calibration of the value of non-market activity (0.95) and
is higher than the calibration of Hall (0.4). Our estimate of the parameter
!ss also pins down the ratio of time spent head-hunting to time spent in
the production activity which turns out to be 4%. Taking into account the
proximity of the shadow prices of di⁄erent allocations of time, this mimics
closely Hagedorn and Manovsky￿ s estimate of the cost of vacancies being
3-4.5% of the quarterly wage. However, unlike their model, most of the
variation in the bargaining set comes from variations in the value of non-
market activity, not the marginal product.
Table 3 reports the prior and posterior distributions of the persistence and
variance parameters of the shocks. The separation rate is the least persistent
with a quarterly autoregressive parameter equal to 0.72. The matching and
government shocks are more persistent, but still signi￿cantly less persistent
than a random walk. The persistence of government consumption is 0.90￿
exactly like in the data. The bargaining shock is close to a random walk. See
Figures in Appendix C to compare the prior and posterior distributions of
the parameters. Our model explains 100% of the variation in the six variables
and thus provides a decomposition we need for the business cycle accounting
exercise.
173 Results
We divide our results into three parts. In the ￿rst part we show that the
labor wedge can be interpreted as the instantaneous welfare gain from a new
match. This surplus shrinks in good times and expands in recessions. The
second part constitutes the descriptive core of our results. We describe the
behavior of the recovered shocks, measure their contributions and evaluate
their e⁄ects on the labor wedge, output and unemployment. We address the
debate between Fujita and Ramey (2007) and Shimer (2005a) on whether
job destruction or job creation is more important for ￿ uctuations in unem-
ployment and output. The last part of this section constitutes the analytic
core of our results. It describes the mechanisms driving our results. We show
the predicted wage rate, compare it to the data and explain why the model
can solve Shimer￿ s puzzle.
3.1 Behavior and Interpretation of the Labor Wedge
Following most of the literature, we de￿ne the labor wedge as the ratio of the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption (MRS) and
the marginal product of labor (MP). Figure 1 depicts the behavior of these
two determinants of the labor wedge. The shaded vertical areas correspond
to the o¢ cial recession periods according to NBER. The picture forces one
to conclude that most of the volatility of the labor wedge comes from varia-
tions in the marginal rate of substitution, rather than the marginal product.
Though we estimate the elasticity of the utility function to be high, this
result is true for most values of the elasticity used in the macro literature.9
In the context of our model, the labor wedge has a new interpretation.
The MRS represents the reservation value (outside option) of workers when
bargaining over the wage, which implies that the di⁄erence between the MP
and the MRS represents the instantaneous welfare gain of a new match.10
It is clear from Figure 1 that the bargaining set narrows in good times and
widens signi￿cantly in recessions. Thus, in bad times the labor wedge widens,
re￿ ecting an increase in the value of new matches and vice versa.
9If we ￿x the elasticity at lower values and re-estimate the model, the results are very
similar.
10The behavior of the instantaneous gain is very similar to that of the lifetime gain.
183.2 Behavior of the Underlying Shocks
Given the estimated parameter values, we can compute the underlying shocks
using the Kalman ￿lter. Figure 2 describes the behavior of the recovered
shocks over the whole forty-￿ve year period. Note that TFP and investment
shocks are random walks with drifts, while the rest of the processes are
stationary.
We ￿nd that total factor productivity slows down at the beginning of each
recession. The investment speci￿c technology tends to increase in recessions
and has a negligible e⁄ect on output and the labor market variables. This
supports the main ￿nding of CKM, that the investment wedge plays only
a tertiary role in U.S. business cycles. The government shock as well as
the investment shock, only a⁄ects consumption and investment. Because
we are primarily interested in the behavior of output, hours, unemployment
and vacancies, for the rest of the exposition we abstract from the behavior of
investment and government shocks. Instead we focus on technological shocks
and shocks that make up the labor wedge.
Figure 1: The Labor Wedge
Figure 2 demonstrates that the separation rate tends to be high at the
beginning of each recession.11 The wave of separations typically starts earlier
11As a consistency check note, these spikes in the separation rate typically coincide with
19Figure 2: The six shocks
than the recession itself and dies out quickly￿ within a year after the start
of a recession.
Notice as well the large decreases in the matching e¢ ciency at later stages
of recessions which lead to declines in the number of new matches and, hence,
cause the amounts of hours worked to fall. While the outside option of
the worker tends to decrease in recessions because of a decrease in their
marginal disutility of work, an increase in the bargaining power tends to
leave wages largely unchanged. Thus, our ￿nding that bargaining power of
workers increases signi￿cantly during recessions is consistent with a view of
wage stickiness as a major source of ine¢ ciency in the labor market.
Let us now take a closer look at the timing of shocks. From Figure 2 it is
clear that declines in TFP slightly precede increases in the separation rate.
An increase in the separation rate is typically followed by an increase in the
bargaining power of workers which precedes or coincides with a decrease in
the matching shock (see also cross-correlations in Appendix D). This implies
that shocks to the separation rate are important at early stages of recessions,
and bargaining and matching shocks come into play later.
spikes observed in Shimer￿ s data.
203.3 Decomposition of the Labor Wedge
To measure the contribution of each shock to a given variable, we shut down
the innovations to it and simulate the model. We obtain paths of output,
hours, unemployment and vacancies, which would have taken place, if only
this distortion were absent. This allows us to compare the actual paths of
variables to their hypothetical paths in a world where one of the imperfections
is absent.
Shutting down innovations to each one of the labor market shocks reveals
a striking picture. Figure 3 shows that absence of separation and bargaining
shocks leaves the labor wedge essentially unchanged, while the absence of
shocks to matching e¢ ciency produces an essentially constant labor wedge.
Thus, most of the ￿ uctuations in the labor wedge are explained by matching
shocks alone.
Figure 3: The decomposition of the labor wedge
Remember that when the Hosios condition holds on average, changes in
the bargaining power do not a⁄ect the labor wedge. Our calibration of ￿
of 0.7 as suggested by Shimer and our estimate of the steady-state value of
the bargaining power of 0.56 are not that far.12 Hence, our result that the
12The e⁄ects of the di⁄erence between ￿ and ￿ss are second order, so a di⁄erence of 20%
would account for 0:22=2 = 2% of variations in the labor wedge.
21Figure 4: Output with all but one shock
bargaining shock has little or no e⁄ect on the labor wedge is not all that
surprising.
3.4 Decomposition of Output and Unemployment
To analyze in detail the e⁄ects of each shock on output and unemployment
and the timing patterns, we focus on the 2001 recession episode, which is the
last recession in our sample. We use this recession to illustrate our results as
it is easier to see the results in a more detailed graph than it is to see them
in a graph containing the whole period. At the end of the section, we show
that the results hold for all recession periods in the sample.
As in the previous subsection, we compare the actual path of GDP with
paths it would have taken if we eliminate e⁄ects of just one of the shocks.
Although only matching shocks matter for the labor wedge, the impact
on output is not so clear-cut. Figure 4 illustrates the e⁄ects of shocks to
TFP, the separation rate, the bargaining power of workers and the matching
e¢ ciency on output.
The vertical axis measures percentage deviations from the path that out-
put would have followed, if all the shocks were constant (the random walks
would preserve their drifts, but innovations are shut down). The solid line
22depicts the actual path of output in the data. The rest of the lines depict
the paths of output if we shut down innovations to just one of the shocks,
eliminating its e⁄ect on the economy.
Figure 4 shows that if there were no change in total factor productivity,
the recession probably would not have started. If there were no separation
shocks at the early stage of the recession, output would have fallen by half
as much. The bargaining shocks added to the depth of the recession, while
shocks to matching e¢ ciency are key to understanding the slow recovery: in
the absence of the adverse matching shocks, the economy would have fully
recovered by summer of 2003.
Thus, Figure 4 demonstrates that although matching shocks explain most
of the dynamics of the labor wedge, they can only account for a fraction of
output dynamics. While shocks to TFP and the separation rate start reces-
sions by accounting for the initial slowdown in output, the role of bargaining
and matching shocks is to deepen the recession and delay the recovery.
Figure 5 depicts a similar decomposition of unemployment. It follows
from Figure 5 that separation shocks are responsible for the initial increase
in unemployment. Increases in the bargaining power of workers start playing
a role only once the economy is already in a recession, reinforcing this initial
increase in unemployment. Declines in matching e¢ ciency leave unemploy-
ment at a high level for a longer period of time after the o¢ cial recession has
already ended, thus accounting for the so-called jobless recovery.
Therefore, after some ￿rms in the economy have become less productive,
the role of the separation shock is to create the initial pool of unemployed
people. As the number of unemployed goes up, the reservation value of
workers goes down signi￿cantly￿ they are willing to work at a lower wage.
The sluggish response of wages drives up the bargaining power of the workers,
while the ￿rm is now in a worsened position. As a result ￿rms start posting
less vacancies, and there are more and more unemployed in the market.
Consistent with this explanation, the sharp increase in the bargaining power
of workers accounts for the bulk of changes in unemployment and vacancies
in the second phase of the recession.
As the number of workers seeking jobs is high and the number of vacancies
is low, the matching e¢ ciency goes down, thus causing output to fall deeper
and the recession to last longer. Figure 5 con￿rms that if there were no
decline in matching e¢ ciency, the recovery from the recession would have
been much faster. Hence, the so-called "jobless recovery" is due mainly to
matching shocks. We attribute this to some form of congestion, which still
23Figure 5: Unemployment with all but one shock
requires an explanation. It can also be some form of disorganization, when
the least e¢ cient and more specialized workers become desperate to ￿nd a job
and wait until better times, consistent with the idea of rest unemployment.
3.5 Decompositions: Summary
Note that the statements made regarding the last recession hold more gen-
erally over the period of interest. A similar decomposition of the previous
four recession episodes shows that the emphasized pattern holds more gener-
ally: separations create the initial pool of unemployed, and adverse matching
shocks slow down the recovery.
To summarize contributions of each shock to each variable of interest, we
set all the other shocks to their steady-state values and simulate the model.
We obtain paths of output, hours, unemployment and vacancies, which would
have taken place if all the other distortions except one were absent. Table 4
reports fractions of standard deviations of output, hours, unemployment and
vacancies, that can be explained by each one of the shocks.
The contribution of the "labor wedge" is measured by hitting the econ-
omy by three shocks: separation, bargaining and matching￿ at the same
time. Earlier we have shown that in our model the "labor wedge" is an
24Shock TFP Invest-t Labor Separation Matching Bargaining
Output 0.67 0.09 0.71 0.31 0.61 0.14
Hours 0.07 0.12 1.03 0.41 1.10 0.25
Unemp-t 0.06 0.04 1.02 1.08 1.26 0.67
Vacancies 0.06 0.04 1.04 0.85 0.95 1.23
Table 4: Ratios of standard deviations explained by each shock over the
whole period
exact combination of just these three shocks (see equation (28)). We thus
provide an exact decomposition of the labor wedge into job destruction and
job creation shocks.
These results address the debate between Fujita and Ramey (2007) and
Shimer (2005b) on whether job destruction or job creation is more important
for ￿ uctuations in unemployment and output. We ￿nd that although shocks
to job creation are more important for the behavior of output and unemploy-
ment, shocks to job destruction cannot be ignored. Changes in the separation
rate account for a signi￿cant fraction of ￿ uctuations and explain the initial
increase in unemployment and decrease in output. Essentially, these shocks
start the recession. Thus, even though their contribution is relatively small,
without job destruction shocks recessions might not have happened in the
￿rst place.
3.6 Wages and Shimer￿ s Puzzle
In an in￿ uential paper, Shimer (2005a) shows that a standard Mortensen-
Pissarides-type model, when hit by productivity shocks of plausible magni-
tude, predicts wages to be more volatile than in the data, while generating
relatively small variations in unemployment and vacancies. This is known as
Shimer￿ s puzzle.
Our model ￿ts the volatility of unemployment and vacancies by construc-
tion. Figure 6 depicts the behavior of wages predicted by the model and
compares it to data (adjusted for the stochastic trend). The model predicts
wages as volatile as in the data, and the correlation between the two is high
(0.56). It is important to consider that we are not using observed wages in
the estimation procedure. The ability of the model to generate a wage series
that close to the observed one is remarkable.
The predicted wage level splits the instantaneous value of the match be-
25Figure 6: Wages: model versus data
tween the worker and the ￿rm in the proportion of their bargaining weights,
as illustrated by Figure 7.
Figure 7 demonstrates that while the reservation value of workers falls
in recessions, wages stay fairly constant, thus indicating that the bargaining
power of workers increases in recessions. This result supports wage stickiness
as a mechanism behind the large changes in the bargaining power of the
workers. However, unlike previous models of Hall (2005a) and Farmer and
Hollenhorst (2006), where increases in the bargaining power in recessions were
a result of declines in the marginal product combined with wage stickiness, in
our model they are a consequence of declines in the reservation value (MRS)
together with wage stickiness.
Thus, allowing for changes in the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure and, consequently, for changes in the reservation
value of workers, our model both matches the volatile behavior of unemploy-
ment and vacancies, and predicts an absence of signi￿cant ￿ uctuations in
wages, just as in the data. Hence, by allowing for variations in the outside
option of workers our model provides a mechanism, which can solve Shimer￿ s
puzzle.
Why do we get these large swings in the marginal rate of substitution,
in the matching e¢ ciency and in the bargaining power? We think that this
26should be a general result in models where agents decide on the margin. More
precisely, we argue that models, where workers and ￿rms equalize bene￿ts
and costs of searching for a job and opening a vacancy, would predict sizable
changes both in shocks and incentives.
First, notice that when workers choose whether to search for a job (equa-
tion (14)), they equate the cost of searching for a job￿ which is equal to the
MRS in our model￿ with the potential bene￿ts of forming a match times the
probability of ￿nding a job. The bene￿ts are equal to the present discounted
value of the wages minus the cost of working, which is also equal to MRS:








Given that in the data the job ￿nding probability Mt
Ut declines signi￿cantly
in recessions (documented by Shimer (2005a)) and the wage is fairly constant,
equation (30) implies that the MRS has to fall by a fair amount. In the
model the large swings in the MRS are due to the estimated elasticity of
the utility function of 3.54￿ a signi￿cantly bigger number than 0.5, typically
assumed in the RBC literature. This result leads us to obtain a much more
volatile series for the labor wedge, which, nonetheless, matches the behavior
27of previous estimates very well. For a comparison of our labor wedge with
the labor wedge of CKM, see Appendix D.
Secondly, notice that when ￿rms choose whether to open a new vacancy,
they also equate the competitive salary they pay to a head-hunter with the
potential bene￿ts of forming a match times the probability of ￿nding a worker
to ￿ll the vacancy. The bene￿ts are equal to the present discounted value of
the marginal product minus the wage that they pay to the worker:
MRSt = (1 ￿ ￿t)￿t
Mt
Vt






Given that we have already established the signi￿cant decreases in the
MRS in recessions, and taking into account the fact that in the data unem-
ployment increases, while the number of vacancies falls and both the wage
and the marginal product are not very volatile, equation (31) implies that
the matching e¢ ciency has to fall signi￿cantly in recessions.
Combining equations (30) and (31) one can ￿nd that the bargaining power







Thus, when unemployment increases and there are fewer vacancies, the
bargaining power of workers has to increase by a comparable amount. Vari-
ations in the separation rate that we estimate are a residual of the labor
accumulation equation in the productive sector.
To summarize, for a model, where both households and ￿rms decide on
the margin how much time to spend searching for each other, to match
aggregate data, one needs to generate large changes in both the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure and the bargaining power of
workers. Procyclical reservation values, along with countercyclical bargaining
power of workers, help match the volatile behavior of unemployment and
vacancies and predict absence of signi￿cant ￿ uctuations in wages, just as in
the data. This mechanism provides a solution to Shimer￿ s puzzle.
4 Conclusion
Motivated by the fact that variations in the labor wedge account for a large
fraction of business cycle ￿ uctuations, we look at the labor wedge through
28the lens of a search and matching model. Using a model that features time-
varying search and matching frictions in the spirit of Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994), Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005a) we decompose the labor
wedge into three broad classes of frictions captured by separation, bargaining
and matching shocks. Using a business cycle accounting methodology simi-
lar to that of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007), we identify the sources
of variations in the labor wedge and assess the importance of job destruc-
tion (separation) and job creation (bargaining and matching) frictions for
business cycles.
We ￿nd that imperfections in the job destruction and bargaining processes
are not helpful in explaining the labor wedge which is mainly driven by
matching shocks. This implies that theories emphasizing wage stickiness and
endogenous job destruction are not very useful for explaining the behavior of
the labor wedge. Instead, according to our results, more attention should be
devoted to studying frictions equivalent to the matching shock in our model,
for example, frictions that lead to cyclical variations in job creation costs,
search e⁄ort, or coordination problems. More speci￿cally, one potential mi-
crofoundation for the matching shock in our model is proposed by Lester
(forthcoming), who shows that when ￿rms have the ability to post multiple
vacancies then the e¢ ciency of the matching process depends on the distri-
bution of vacancies among ￿rms, increasing in concentration of vacancies.
Although only matching shocks a⁄ect the labor wedge, both frictions
in job creation and job destruction play an important role in output and
unemployment ￿ uctuations. We ￿nd that job destruction and job creation
shocks play a role at di⁄erent points in time. In a recession, separation shocks
account for the initial increase in unemployment, bargaining shocks help
amplify the increase in unemployment, while matching shocks are responsible
for the slow recovery.
Finally, our results also provide a potential solution to Shimer￿ s puzzle.
We ￿nd that introducing variations in the reservation value of workers is a
feature worth exploring in search and matching models in order to match the
observed volatility of unemployment, vacancies and wages.
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In the following subsection we show the solution to the same model as in the
main body of the paper, but when solved as a social planner￿ s problem. The
decentralized version of the model has a missing equilibrium condition that
is typically replaced with a Nash bargaining condition to ￿x the real wage.
We take advantage of this missing condition, and by comparing the social
planner￿ s solution with the decentralized version of the model, we construct
a time varying bargaining shock, which implicitly determines the wage rate.
A.1.1 The Social Planner￿ s Problem
To compare competitive allocations with an e¢ cient one we solve the social
planning problem. The social planner maximizes the discounted present value












(Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K)Kt) + Gt ￿ AtF(Kt;Lt) (34)
Lt = (1 ￿ ￿L)Lt￿1 + Mt (35)





























































32Together with equations (7)-(8) they describe the allocations a social plan-
ner would choose. ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the labor
accumulation constraint. Given that Tt, At, ￿Lt, Gt and Bt are exogenous, we
have a systemof eight equations and eight unknowns fKt+1;Lt;Ct;Mt;Yt;Vt;Ut;￿tg.
A.1.2 Constructing a Time Varying Bargaining Shock
By comparing the social planner￿ s optimality conditions with those of the
decentralized problem, we can ￿nd the necessary assumptions to make the
decentralized problem e¢ cient.










and if we compare this expression with equation (38), and equation (14) with















so that the optimality conditions on vacancies and unemployment are the
same in the decentralized and planner￿ s problem. Furthermore, if we assume






Vt = M(Ut;Vt) (42)
then ￿t = ￿t + ￿t and the decentralized outcome is Pareto-optimal. Hence,













As an illustration, assume @Mt
@Ut
Ut
Mt = ￿ and @Mt
@Vt
V t
Mt = (1￿￿), which together
with conditions (43) and (44) give
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿t (45)
and
33￿t = ￿￿t (46)
Notice that if we replace equations (45) and (46) in equations (10) and
(11) and sum them up, we get equation (37), hence the optimality condi-
tions for labor in the decentralized version become equal to the optimality
condition for labor in the planners problem.
Furthermore, if we divide equation (10) by equation (11) and use equa-


















































represents the instantaneous bene￿t from
the match earned by the worker. Since the bargaining power of the worker
































is the di⁄erence between the marginal product of
labor and the marginal disutility of labor. This term represents the instan-
taneous marginal value of the match, and a fraction ￿ goes to the worker.
To introduce the time varying bargaining shock we build on this result,
re-parameterize and substitute ￿ by ￿t. ￿t is time varying and follows an
exogenous autoregressive process. Notice that replacing ￿ by ￿t implies that
allocations are suboptimal whenever ￿t 6= ￿.
Equations (45) and (46) are replaced by
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿t)￿t (49)
￿t = ￿t￿t (50)
Once again if we substitute equations (49) and (50) in (10) and (11) we get
equation (37) so it is still true that the optimality conditions for labor of the
34decentralized version imply the optimality condition for labor of the planner￿ s
problem. Dividing equation (10) by equation (11) and using equations (49)
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￿t (1 ￿ ￿Lt+1) and can be interpreted as a stochastic discount
factor for labor.
A.1.3 Identi￿cation
In this section we show how given data on allocations: output, investment,
consumption, employment, vacancies and unemployment one can solve for
the shocks. Let us ￿rst rewrite the equations of the model given the para-










+ Gt = Yt (55)























￿t+1 (1 ￿ ￿Lt+1) (58)
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)
Yt
Lt
￿ wt + ￿Et
Ct
Ct+1
￿t+1 (1 ￿ ￿Lt+1) (59)




















Now we shall describe a mechanism to recover the shocks given parame-
ters and functional forms. Given data on consumption Ct (or government
spending Gt), output Yt, investment Xt, employment Lt + Vt, number of va-
cancies Vt and the unemployment rate Ut
Lt+Vt+Ut, one can uniquely recover the
time path for the variables of interest Lt,Vt,Ut. Then equation (54) uniquely
pins down the path for capital given the initial level K0, equation (53) pins
down the e¢ ciency shock At, equation (55) pins down consumption or gov-
ernment spending, equation (57) can be solved forward to obtain the path
for the investment shock as in CKM.
From equations (60) and (61) it follows that ￿tUt = ￿tVt. Then summing
up equations (58) and (59) one obtains:
￿Ct￿(Lt + Ut + Vt)



















(1 ￿ ￿Lt+1) (63)
Using equation (60) the Lagrange multiplier ￿t can be expressed as a
function of the matching shock Bt:
￿t =







36Also the separation rate is connected to the matching shock through the
labor accumulation equation (56):



































Lt+1 + Ut+1 + Vt+1










Equation (66) provides a forward-looking equation for the matching shock
Bt+1 as a function of Bt. Solving this equation recursively given some initial
value B0 we can recover the whole path for the matching shock. Then equa-
tion (65) allows us to back up the separation rate, equations (61) and (60)
allow us to calculate the Lagrange multipliers ￿t and ￿t. Then from equation
(62) we can compute the bargaining shock ￿t.
Altogether equations (54-62) describe a one-to-one mapping between the
data and the underlying shocks. However the algorithm described here is
hard to implement directly for two reasons. First, the equations are forward
looking and can only be solved under certain assumptions about expectation
formation. Second, many of the parameters of the model are unknown and
cannot be simply calibrated from microeconomic data. That is the reason
why we postulate stochastic processes for the shocks, linearize the model
around a steady-state to compute an approximate solution and use Kalman
￿lter to recover the underlying processes for the shocks.
A.2 Appendix B
A.2.1 The Detrended Model

















ct + ztkt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K)
kt
￿t
















￿t = (Vt + Ut)￿t
￿tVt = (1 ￿ ￿t)Ut










mt = (1 ￿ ￿Lt)
￿t
￿t￿1







￿t = ￿ct (Lt + Ut + Vt)
￿






1 ￿ Etmt+1 t+1
￿
(wt ￿ ￿t) =
￿







at = ass exp(￿At"At)
38￿t = ￿ss exp(￿Tt"Tt)
log￿Lt = (1 ￿ ￿S)log￿Lss + ￿S log￿Lt￿1 + ￿S"St
logBt = (1 ￿ ￿M)logbss + ￿M logBt￿1 + ￿M"Mt
log￿t = (1 ￿ ￿B)log￿ss + ￿B log￿t￿1 + ￿B"Bt










kt+1zt￿t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K)kt












A.2.2 Computing the Steady-State.
Choose a value of Lss














3) kss = ’Lss yss = ass’￿Lss
4) css =
h



























8) We have assumed a normalization ￿ =
￿
(Lss+Uss+Vss)￿
9) ￿ss = ￿css mss = 1 ￿ ￿L
10) ￿ss = ￿css
!ss
￿ss
11) wss = ￿ss (1 ￿ ￿)
yss
Lss ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ss)￿ss
12)  ss =
￿
zss qss = ￿ss
40A.3 Appendix C
Figure 8: Prior (grey) and posterior (black) distributions of parameters
41Wedge E¢ ciency Investment Labor
Output 0.73 0.31 0.59
Table 5: Ratios of standard deviations explained by each wedge. Source:
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007)
A.4 Appendix D
A.4.1 Comparison to CKM
Figure 9: Comparison of the Labor Wedge to the Estimate of CKM
A.4.2 Full Decompositions and Correlation Structure
Table 5 reports the numbers from the original paper by Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2007). Comparing the second row of Tables 5 and 6 one can
verify that our decompositions are comparable with those of CKM since
the di⁄erence in the contributions of TFP, Investment and Labor shocks is
insigni￿cant. Table 6 also gives a clearer picture of the relative contributions
of the labor shocks.
Table 7 reports the same fractions of standard deviations as Table 4, but
averaged over a selection of recession periods. It demonstrates that during
recessions the labor wedge and TFP play a slightly more important role in
business cycles than in normal times, while the contribution of investment
shocks is negligible both in recessions and overall.
42Shock TFP Investment Government Labor
Output 0.67 0.09 0.05 0.70
Consumption 0.68 0.86 0.65 0.51
Investment 0.57 0.43 0.40 0.41
Hours 0.07 0.12 0.08 1.02
Unemployment 0.06 0.04 0.04 1.00
Vacancies 0.06 0.04 0.04 1.00
Shock TFP Separation Matching Bargaining
Output 0.67 0.32 0.61 0.14
Consumption 0.68 0.38 0.63 0.07
Investment 0.57 0.38 0.51 0.05
Hours 0.07 0.41 1.10 0.25
Unemployment 0.06 1.08 1.26 0.67
Vacancies 0.06 0.85 0.95 1.23
Table 6: Ratios of standard deviations explained by each shock over the
whole period (1964-2007)
Shock TFP Investment Government Labor
Output 0.76 0.08 0.05 0.71
Consumption 0.71 0.87 0.66 0.48
Investment 0.68 0.47 0.48 0.42
Hours 0.05 0.05 0.06 1.02
Unemployment 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.99
Vacancies 0.05 0.03 0.03 1.01
Shock TFP Separation Matching Bargaining
Output 0.76 0.34 0.62 0.16
Consumption 0.71 0.36 0.56 0.19
Investment 0.68 0.48 0.52 0.06
Hours 0.05 0.28 0.82 0.31
Unemployment 0.04 0.48 0.57 0.60
Vacancies 0.05 0.60 0.68 1.41
Table 7: Ratios of standard deviations explained by each shock averaged over
5 recessions (70,75,82,91,01)
43Correlation of X with Y at lag k
Shocks (X,Y) -2 -1 0 1 2
TFP, Investment -0.70 -0.68 -0.61 -0.58 -0.54
TFP, Government 0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06
Investment, Government -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.13 -0.10
TFP, Separation -0.44 -0.45 -0.44 -0.39 -0.29
TFP, Matching -0.39 -0.31 -0.21 -0.12 -0.00
TFP, Bargaining 0.26 0.11 -0.02 -0.15 -0.26
Separation, Bargaining 0.89 0.85 0.72 0.57 0.43
Separation, Matching -0.77 -0.68 -0.55 -0.39 -0.25
Bargaining, Matching -0.72 -0.83 -0.89 -0.90 -0.85
Table 8: Cross Correlations of Shocks and Their Lags
Table 8 reports cross correlations of shocks at di⁄erent lags con￿rming
the picture of TFP and separation shocks starting recessions and bargaining
and matching shocks coming into play only later on.
A.5 Appendix E
Figure 10 demonstrates the emphasized decomposition of unemployment for
previous four recession episodes: separations create the initial pool of unem-
ployed, and adverse matching shocks slow down the recovery.
Figure 11 shows that if there was no change in the labor wedge, the
recession would have been much shorter (if at all noticeable) and half as
severe. If there was no change in total factor productivity, the recession
probably wouldn￿ t have started. Absence of investment shocks would have
almost no e⁄ect on the path of output. Thus the TFP shock is at work
mostly at the start of the recession of 2001. The labor wedge explains the
bulk of ￿ uctuations in output after the recession has started.
Figure 12 shows that matching shocks are the main source of declines in
the number of hours worked. Figure 13 demonstrates that bargaining shocks
are the main source of declines in the number of vacancies during the 2001
recession.
44Figure 10: E⁄ects of separation and matching shocks on unemployment
Figure 11: Output with all but one shock
45Figure 12: Hours with all but one shock
Figure 13: Vacancies with all but one shock
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